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I. INTRODUCTION
United States Department of Defense, definition of an
"unmanned aerial vehicle":
[a] powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator,
uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly
autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or
recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. Ballistic
or semiballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles
are not considered unmanned aerial vehicles.'
In an effort to combat terrorism threats throughout the world,
the United States has increasingly used unmanned aerial
vehicles or drones to target and kill enemies.2 Leon Panetta, the
then-Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) Director, famously
boasted that drones were "the only game in town."' The most
commonly used drones include the Predator drone, the Global
Hawk, the Shadow, the Hunter, the Raven, and the Wasp;
additional drones to be operated in the near future include the
Reaper, the Peregrine, and the Vulture.' Larger drones, such as
the Predator and the Reaper, are equipped with Hellfire missiles
and used to conduct lethal strikes, whereas smaller drones are
used primarily for surveillance and target acquisition.' Drones
are not unmanned, but rather remotely piloted by both a pilot
and a sensor operator, from remote locations; typically, a drone
operation also involves launch and recovery teams, intelligence
I U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., THE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY TERMS 577 (2009).
2 David Rohde, The Drone Wars, REUTERS (Jan. 26, 2012, 9:11 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/26/us-david-rohde-drone-wars-
idUSTRE80P11I20120126. For the purposes of this Article, the more commonly
used term "drone" will be used to refer to "unmanned aerial vehicles." In
addition, this Article will focus on legal issues pertaining to the covert C.I.A.-
conducted use of drones. While many of these legal issues also apply to the non-
covert use of drones by the United States military, this Article will particularly
focus on issues raised by the covert use of drones by the C.I.A. Moreover, while
drones can be used for both surveillance and lethal targeting operations, the
focus of this Article will be on the latter, more controversial utilization of drones.
See discussion infra Parts II, III.A-E.
Pam Benson, U.S. Airstrikes in Pakistan Called Very Effective', CNN (May
18, 2009, 6:48 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/18/cia.pakistan.airstrikes/.
4 P.W. Singer, Military Robots and the Laws of War, 23 NEw ATLANTIS 27,
38-41 (2009).
1 Id. at 39-41.
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analysts, and other law and policy decision-makers.6
Under the Obama Administration, the number of drone strikes
has sharply increased, prompting criticism and concern.' As one
commentator has noted, "[u]nder Obama, drone strikes have
become too frequent, too unilateral, and too much associated with
the heavy-handed use of American power."' Many scholars have
focused on the legal issues arising from the use of drones,
analyzing their legality under applicable law of self-defense, as
well as under international humanitarian law and international
human rights law. This Article will highlight another
problematic aspect of the current American use of drones, which
is secrecy. As will be argued below, because a large number of
lethal strikes are conducted by covert C.I.A. operations, it is
impossible to determine whether most strikes comply with
relevant legal provisions of both domestic and international law.'
Section II will examine the so-called "problem of secrecy," by
describing the current C.I.A. unwillingness to release records and
documents pertaining to targeted killings conducted through
drone strikes, and by asking questions about the utility of such
secrecy in a democratic society.'o Section III will then focus on all
the relevant legal issues related to the use of drones, including
the relevant domestic legal authority to conduct targeted killings,
associated international law issues, as well as the definition of
the battlefield and an examination of the legality of different
types of strikes. This Article will conclude that while it is
possible that drone strikes may be legal under relevant domestic
and international law, this conclusion cannot be reached because
of secrecy. Secrecy, as perpetuated through the C.I.A.'s refusal to
publicly discuss the drone program and to provide relevant
guidelines, policy, and legal rationales toward the use of drones,
has disabled all of us from reaching appropriate legal, moral, and
humanitarian judgment about the legality of drone strikes. This
6 Laurie R. Blank, After "Top Gun" How Drone Strikes Impact the Law of
War, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 675, 677 (2012).
See Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What Are the Risks of the C.I.A.'s Covert
Drone Program?, NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2009),
http://newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa-fact-mayer; David Rohde,
How Obama's Drone War is Backfiring, REUTERS (Mar. 1, 2012),
http://blogs.reuters.com/david-rohde/2012/03/01/how-obamas-drone-war-is-
backfiring/.
I Rohde, supra note 7.
9 See discussion infra Part III.A-E.
10 See discussion infra Part II.
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Article will argue that any use of lethal force by the United
States, including the use of drones to conduct targeted killings,
must be properly legally justified, and that such legal
justifications should become a part of public discourse.
II. THE PROBLEM OF SECRECY
The United States currently operates two separate drone
programs: an overt one and a covert one." The first program,
which has been overt and publicly acknowledged by the United
States government, is directed by the Pentagon and Joint Special
Operations Command (JSOC) in declared combat theaters of
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. 2 The second, covert program is
commanded by the C.I.A. and operates in Pakistan, Somalia, and
Yemen." According to various investigative reports, it appears
that most lethal strikes are conducted by the C.I.A. 4 Because the
C.I.A. drone program has been covert, little public information
has been available about the policy and legal framework of the
C.I.A.-run targeting operations." Secrecy in this context is highly
problematic, because it has disabled the public, as well as our
courts, from asking pertinent questions about the legality of the
drone program. Secrecy in this context has been called into
question both internationally as well as domestically, within the
United States.'"
International concerns over the use of drones culminated in
September 2014, when "the U[nited] N[ations] Human Rights
Council's (HRC) expert panel on the use of armed drones and
international law, expressed clear consensus around the need for
greater transparency and accountability, and that what is most
required is respect and implementation of existing law around
I ASHLEY S. BOYLE, CONTEXTUALIZING THE DRONES DEBATE 1 (Am. Sec.
Project 2012), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/102775947/Contextualizing-the-Drones-Debate.
12 Id.
" Id.
' See generally Mayer, supra note 7 (noting that the Obama Administration
has authorized C.I.A. missile strikes averaging about one bombing a week since
taking office).
'5 See id.
6 See, e.g., Christopher Rogers, Towards a Global Debate? UN Human Rights
Council Takes on Drones, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 25, 2014, 9:48 AM),
http://justsecurity.org/15521/global-debate-human-rights-council-takes-drones/
(discussing the need for both U.S. and international transparency).
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the use of such weapons."" The expert panel, "which included the
U[nited] N[ations] Special Rapporteurs on Counter-Terrorism
and Human Rights as well as on Extrajudicial Executions .. . was
organized pursuant to a Pakistan-sponsored resolution.""
Experts discussed several legal questions raised by the use of
armed drones, "from the nature and scope of their use in armed
conflict against non-state actors to the applicability and
requirements of international human rights law (IHRL) with
respect to the use of armed drones, and the legal responsibilities
of states affect by or hosting lethal drone operations."" The
expert panel highlighted the problem of secrecy, by emphasizing
the need for greater government accountability and transparency,
for any nation using drones to conduct targeted strikes." While it
is unclear what the next steps regarding any United Nations'
involvement in the member states' use of drones may be, "[w]hat
is clear from the council's panel is that there is agreement among
most states and experts that addressing the unique risks that
drones pose to international law demands an international
response."2
Domestic concern over the secret use of drones by the C.I.A.
has not been negligible either. In June 2014, a bipartisan panel
of experts, composed of former senior intelligence and military
officials, condemned a "'long-term killing program based on secret
rationales' and recommended that the bulk of drone operations
be shifted from the C.I.A. toward the Pentagon.22 In addition, in
January 2010, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request seeking the release,
by the C.I.A., of records concerning the use of drones to carry out
" Id.
Is Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Mark Mazzetti, Use of Drones for Killings Risks a War Without End, Panel
Concludes in Report, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2014, at All. This Article's focus is
on secrecy, and how secrecy inherent in C.I.A.'s covert drone operations has
inhibited the existence of any true public debate about the program itself, and
has made it extremely difficult to reach concrete conclusions about the legality
of the drone program. While this Article urges the C.I.A. to remedy this issue by
releasing more information about the policy and guidelines regarding its
targeting operations, another potential solution, as recommended by the Panel,
would be to shift all drone operations from the C.I.A. toward the military. This
Article agrees with that recommendation, but maintains that in the present,
because the C.I.A. continues to conduct drone strikes, it is important to continue
to discuss secrecy concerns regarding the Agency.
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targeted killings.23 The C.I.A. responded several months later
asserting a "Glomar" defense by refusing to reject or acknowledge
the mere existence of such records.24 In March 2013, the D.C.
Circuit court rejected the Glomar response, and in August 2013,
the C.I.A provided a "no-number no-list" response, in which it
acknowledged that it had responsive documents, but it refused to
list or describe them.25 In April 2014, the Second Circuit rejected
the "no-number no-list" response, and finally, in September 2004,
the C.I.A agreed to search for a subset of records which the ACLU
had requested almost five years earlier.26 In the meantime,
between January 2010 and September 2014, the Obama
Administration had publicly acknowledged the existence of the
C.I.A.-operated drone program, and had offered legal rationales
for the use of drones to lethally target foreign and American
citizens.27
In light of such Administration disclosures, one has to ask
about the usefulness and arguably wastefulness of litigation
resources by the C.I.A. Why did the Agency choose to stall for
almost five years and to continue to refuse to provide any
information about its use of drones?2 8 Such unnecessary secrecy
has prevented the development of true public debates about the
scope of American drone operations, and about their compliance
with relevant domestic and international law.29 Secrecy has also
prevented the existence of any judicial review over "lethal
targeting" operations.30 While the inherent goal of any secrecy is
to limit the flow of information, in this instance, information had
already been circulating through President Obama
23 Predator Drones FOIA, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/national-
security/predator-drones-foia (last visited Oct. 30, 2014).
24 Steve Vladeck, D.C. Circuit Rejects Glomar Response in ACLU/CIA Drone
FOIA Suit, LAWFARE (Mar. 15, 2013, 10:21 AM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/d-c-circuit-rejects-glomar-response-in-
aclucia-drone-foia-suit/.
25 See Jameel Jaffer, Selective Disclosure About Targeted Killing, JUST
SECURITY (Oct. 7, 2013, 9:25 AM), http://justsecurity.org/1704/selective-
disclosure-targeted-killing/.
26 See Jameel Jaffer, The Erosion of a Secret, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 12, 2014,
11:56 AM), http://justsecurity.org/14908/erosion-secret/.
27 See infra Part III.A.3 for a complete account of high-level Administration
officials' disclosures and speeches about the drone program.
28 See Jaffer, supra note 26.
29 See generally CTR. FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT & COLUMBIA LAW SCH. HUMAN
RIGHTS CLINIC, THE CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES: UNEXAMINED COSTS,
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS (2012) (discussing various concerns of secrecy).
30 See id. (noting legal concerns addressing lethal targeting).
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Administration's disclosures about the drone program."
Moreover, difficult discussions about difficult choices are inherent
features of any democratic nation, and the C.I.A.'s withholding of
information regarding the use of drones undermines the very
existence of democratic debate in our country. It also appears
unfair that high-level government officials have consistently
leaked documents and provided some disclosure about the drone
program, while the C.I.A. has been permitted to maintain almost
total secrecy.3 2 As Jameel Jaffer, deputy legal director of the
ACLU, argued:
In media interviews and speeches ... officials have defended the
[drone] program's legality, effectiveness, and necessity. They've
dismissed concerns about civilian casualties. And through not-for-
attribution interviews with reporters, they've engaged in what one
appeals-court judge called "a pattern of strategic and selective
leaks at the highest level of government." . . . [T]he administration
shouldn't be permitted to pretend that everything about the
program is a secret while its most senior officials conduct a public-
relations campaign about it.
It will be interesting to find what type of information the C.I.A.
will ultimately release in the ACLU-filed FOIA request lawsuit,34
and whether such information will be useful toward assessing the
lawfulness of the drone program. Nonetheless, any additional
information will be valuable toward the existence of public debate
about this difficult issue.
In Part III below, this Article will discuss relevant legal
questions pertaining to the United States' use of drones; such
questions arise under both domestic and international law. As
this Article has already argued, answering such questions
requires public access to information regarding each drone
operation, and because the C.I.A. has, until now, refused to
disclose much of such relevant information," many questions
below remain unanswered. It may be that the C.I.A. drone
program comports with all the relevant requirements of domestic
and international law, but secrecy has prevented any of us from
reaching that conclusion.
11 See id.
32 Id.; see Predator Drones FOIA, supra note 23.
31 Jaffer, supra note 25.
34 See id.; Predator Drones FOIA, supra note 23.
1 See supra Part II.
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III. RELEVANT LEGAL QUESTIONS REGARDING THE USE OF
DRONES
The United States has used drones to conduct lethal strikes on
the territories of other sovereign states." This type of use of
deadly force requires an examination of two sets of questions."
First, does the use of drones comport with domestic law, including
the Constitution and all relevant federal statutes,6 and second,
whether the use of drones satisfies all the requirements of
international law, including jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and
international human rights law?39  These questions will be
analyzed below, but, as this Article argues throughout, it may be
impossible to satisfactorily answer each of these questions
because of secrecy.
A. Are Drone Strikes Legal Under Domestic Law?
The first and most important question to ask regarding the use
of drones is whether the United States has domestic legal
authority to use lethal force in the territory of other sovereign
nations. Drone strikes have been conducted in Afghanistan, Iraq
and Libya, our declared combat zones, as well as in other states
such as Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen;40 they may be used in
other countries, such as Syria.4 1 Each of such drone strikes
represent the use of military force by the United States
President, and each of such drone strikes must find domestic
legal authority in either the Constitution or a federal statute.4 2
Each of these questions will be analyzed below.
1. The Legality of Covert Drone Strikes Under the United
States Constitution
Scholars have made various arguments regarding the
constitutionality of the C.I.A. drone program. Jamie Kleidman
36 See Leila Sadat, Second Annual Katherine B. Fite Lecture: Drone Wars and
the Nuremberg Legacy, 45 STUD. TRANSNAT'L LEGAL POL'Y 9, 11-12 (2012).
37 Id. at 12-13.
31 See infra Part A.
" See infra Part B.
40 Sadat, supra note 36, at 12.
41 Drone Strikes in Syria? CIA 'Boosting'Intelligence Force to 'Size Up'Syrian
Extremists, RT (Mar. 17, 2013), http://rt.com/news/syria-usa-rebel-drone-356/.
42 See generally Sadat, supra note 36, at 28-33 (explaining the justification
for the use of lethal force against terrorists).
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has argued that the United States Constitution authorizes covert
action, of the type conducted via drone strikes.43 Kleidman
reaches this argument after analyzing several provisions of the
Constitution, which relate to military and foreign affairs and
"evidence(] the framers intent to create a strong national
government and country that was less susceptible to outside
attacks."" According to Kleidman, these provisions include the
preamble, art. I § 8, as well as art. IV § 4, which all represent
evidence that the framers intent was that the United States
should have a means to protect itself against foreign nations and
attacks.45 Kleidman thus concludes that drone attacks, because
they are conducted to prevent future al-Qaeda attacks against
our country and because they are employed as part of the United
States' inherent right of self-defense "fall under the types of
activities the framers thought would be necessary to protect the
U.S." 46 Additionally, Kleidman argues that the early history of
covert actions evidences further belief that the United States has
the authority to engage in such actions.4 7 Because the Predator
drone program is a covert action, and because covert actions are
constitutional, according to Kleidman the drone program itself
must be constitutional.48
Kleidman has further argued that both the legislative and the
executive branches have concurrent authority over the
authorization of covert actions, such as drone strikes.4 9 Congress
has the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal, which are
"commissions by Congress that grant private individuals
permission to use force against foreign nations."o Although
Congress has not formally issued any letters of marque and
reprisal since the 1800s, the United States has continued to use
covert paramilitary force, at times led by the C.I.A, in order to
advance foreign policy interests abroad." Although Kleidman
herself acknowledges the distinction between letters of marque
and reprisal clause and covert drone strikes, she argues that the
43 See Jamie L. Kleidman, The Constitutionality of the Predator Drone
Program, 4 VIENNA ONLINE J. ON INT'L CONST. L. 359, 361-62 (2010).
4 Id. at 362.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 361-64.
48 Id. at 363-64.
49 Id. at 371.
so Id. at 366.
5' Id.
2015]1 137
ALBANY GOVERNMENT LAW REVIEW
framers must have been "aware of incidents short of war that
would require the use of force, and delegated the authority to
authorize such force to Congress."52 Congress also has authority
to declare war; this according to Kleidman encompasses all kinds
of war, whether declared or undeclared." If a covert action takes
place as part of an ongoing war, the power to "declare war" clause
is relevant and "evidences the framers intent that Congress
should be involved to some degree any time the U.S. decides to
engage in some use of force."54
In addition, the Constitution provides that the President serves
as commander in chief of the armed forces, and is the nation's
sole organ in foreign affairs." Although scholars have debated
whether the President has the ability to deploy troops and engage
in military operations, it is undisputed that the President has
authority to direct operations on the battlefield." To the extent
that covert drone operations are congressionally authorized via
statute, and used as part of the so-called "War on Terror[,]"
Kleidman argues that the President has authority to order drone
strikes." Additionally, Kleidman argues that history and past
precedent support the argument that the President has some
constitutional independent authority to conduct covert actions,
such as drone strikes."
Throughout history Presidents have continued to claim authority
to introduce troops into limited hostilities and engage in covert
action.... [T]he President maintains plenary, exclusive, and
inherent authority in matters of foreign relations and national
security, and thus executive power in this realm is not necessarily
limited to those powers enumerated in the constitution.
In light of the above, Kleidman concludes that the legislative
and executive branches have concurrent authority over the
authorization for covert actions, such as drone strikes."o More
52 Id. at 367.
5 Id.
54 Id. at 368.
55 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Kleidman, supra note 43, at 370.
56 See Jules Lobel, Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress:
Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 391, 393, 396
(2008).
5 See Kleidman, supra note 43, at 369.
58 Id.
9 Id. at 370.
60 Id. at 371.
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particularly, in this context, the President has delegated his
authority to conduct drone strikes to the C.I.A.6 1 According to
Kleidman, this is constitutionally permissible because the
President "may delegate parts of his authority, like the decision
to target certain terrorists as part of an on-going covert action."62
Kleidman believes that this type of delegation to the C.I.A. is
beneficial, because "the CIA maintains a level of expertise over
covert action that the President does not possess[,j" because the
decision to use drones must be made in a matter of seconds and
the C.I.A may be in the best position to assess the situation, and
because the C.I.A has "expertise to determine when and how to
target an individual."
While Kleidman may be correct that the use of drones as a
covert action is constitutionally permissible, this conclusion on its
own should not prevent the public from asking questions about
the drone program itself. It is not enough to simply conclude that
the C.I.A. is best suited to engage in this type of lethal operations;
that conclusion would presume that the C.I.A.'s constitutional
authority to conduct covert drone strikes knows no limits. This is
simply not true. Each drone strike must comport with relevant
domestic statutes and international law which will be discussed
below, and in order to know whether each drone strike has
satisfied such domestic and international law more public
information should be available and willingly shared by the C.I.A.
While everyone would agree that the need for secrecy is implicit
in covert operations, and that the C.I.A. could not possibly release
information about the particularities of each drone strike it
conducts, the Agency could release more general information
about the legal and policy guidelines that it follows as a general
matter. Concluding that the Constitution authorizes the C.I.A. to
conduct covert actions does not support the argument that the
C.I.A. can secretly conduct drone operations anywhere in the
world without having to answer any questions to anyone.
2. The Legality of Drone Strikes Under Federal Statute
The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), a
Congressional statute passed in the wake of the September 11
terrorist attacks on the United States, authorizes the use of
61 Id. at 377-78.
62 Id. at 378.
63 Id.
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drones against leaders of al-Qaeda forces, to target or to kill
enemies.' The AUMF has been cited by the Bush and Obama
Administrations as domestic authorization for the use of force via
drones, in both traditional warfare, as well as, against terrorist
suspects." The argument that drone strikes are specifically
authorized through the AUMF goes as follows: because members
of al-Qaeda and the Taliban can constitute a continuing threat to
the safety of the United States, eliminating such continuing
threat via drone strikes is a means to prevent future acts of
international terrorism.66 The AUMF specifically authorizes the
President to do this, and this expansive reading of the AUMF
would place almost no limitations on the President's authority to
wage the so-called "war on terror."67 While the Obama
Administration no longer uses the term "war on terror," it has
interpreted the AUMF in virtually the same way as the Bush
Administration.68
Many scholars have disagreed with this type of expansive
interpretation of the AUMF." Moreover, this rationale invites a
host of legitimate questions regarding the localization of ongoing
64 See generally S. J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (authorizing
the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons" that he determines in some way aided the attacks of
9/11, "in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the
United States . . . .").
65 See Ryan Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 DENV. J.
INT'LL. & POL'Y 101, 105 (2010).
66 See id. at 108.
67 "War on terror" was a term coined by the Bush Administration, to describe
the conflict that the United States entered as of September 11, 2001, against
those responsible for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While the
AUMF does not use the term "war on terror," it does provide the President with
authority to use force against .' nations, organizations, or persons' [which] the
President determined 'planned, authorized, committed, or aided' the terrorist
attacks [of September 11,] as well-as those who 'harbored such organizations or
persons."' Id.; see Richard W. Stevenson, President Makes it Clear: Phrase is
'War on Terror', N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/04/politics/04bush.html?_r=0 (discussing
President Bush's use of the phrase "war on terror"). Moreover, the AUMF
contemplates a global war against specific terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda
and the Taliban and associated forces. Vogel, supra note 65, at 108.
68 Vogel, supra note 65, at 108; see Stevenson, supra note 67.
69 One of the most vocal opponents of this type of rationale has been
Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O'Connell, Unlawful
Killing with Combat Drones. A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009, in SHOOTING
To KILL: THE LAw GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE IN CONTEXT 13 (Simon Bronitt ed.,
forthcoming, Notre Dame Law Legal Studies Paper No. 09-43), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501144.
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drone strikes. For example, how do we know that drone strikes
conducted presently are truly linked to al-Qaeda forces
responsible for the attacks of September 11 (because only those
targets are contemplated through the AUMF)?" What is the link
between current terrorism suspects targeted through C.I.A. drone
operations, and al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders engaged in the
conflict back in 2001? And why does this conflict have no
geographic boundaries? Accepting the AUMF as authorization
for the use of lethal force by the United States against those
responsible for the attacks of September 11 does not amount to
accepting the AUMF as a perpetual statutory authorization to
use deadly force through covert operations throughout the world
against suspects who may have only circumstantial ties to the
master-minds of September 11. Because most lethal drone
strikes are conducted through covert C.I.A. operations," we do
not know whether suspects targeted today are those covered by
the AUMF. Accepting the agency's promise that they are, simply
is not enough.
3. The United States Government's Legal and Policy
Rationale for Using Drones
In addition to assessing the legality of drone strikes under the
United States Constitution and federal law, it is important to
highlight the legal rationales advanced by the Bush and the
Obama Administrations within domestic theaters; as such
rationales form a basis for arguing toward the legality of this type
of use of lethal force under domestic law.
The Bush Administration used the term "war on terror" to
describe an ongoing global conflict against terrorism that the
United States had been engaged in starting from September 11,
2001, when terrorists attacked the World Trade Center.72 The
Obama Administration has adopted a slightly different rhetoric,
and has argued that the United States is engaged in an armed
70 See S. J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
71 See Greg Miller, CIA Remains Behind Most Drone Strikes, Despite Effort to
Shift Campaign to Defense, WASH. PosT (Nov. 25, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-remains-behind-
most-drone-strikes-despite-effort-to-shift-campaign-to-
defense/2013/11/25/cOc07a86-5386-11e3-a7f-b790929232el story.html.
72 See Stevenson, supra note 67 (discussing President Bush's use of the
phrase "war on terror").
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conflict against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces." As
will be argued below, the Obama Administration has essentially
followed the Bush Administration's approach in determining that
the conflict is global in nature and that targeted strikes can be
carried out anywhere; the change in terminology appears to be
pure semantics.74 In recent speeches, high-level officials of the
Obama Administration, as well as President Obama himself,
have offered more detailed legal justification about the use of
drones to conduct targeted killings." These disclosures, although
welcome, illustrate further the unreasonableness of the C.I.A.'s
unwillingness to disclose information about its targeting
practices. If high-level government officials and our President
choose to discuss law and policy surrounding drone use, then the
C.I.A. can no longer rely on secrecy to justify its silence on this
issue.
In 2010, Harold Koh, then Legal Advisor to the State
Department, justified the use of drones arguing "that U.S.
targeting practices, including lethal operations conducted with
the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply with all applicable
law, including the laws of war."" Koh relied both on the AUMF
and on international law in his remarks. Koh argued that the
United States engages in targeted strikes in accordance with the
laws of war, respecting principles such as distinction and
proportionality to ensure that the targets are legitimate and that
collateral damage is minimized." Koh offered four different
reasons to support the legality of targeted strikes." First, Koh
argued that United States' drone targets have been legitimate
because they are belligerent members of an enemy group in a war
" See Vogel, supra note 65, at 108.
74 See infra Part III.D for a discussion of the global battle field.
5 See Greg Miller, Legal Memo Backing Drone Strike that Killed American
Anwar al-Awlaki is Released, WASH. POST (June 23, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/legal-memo-backing-
drone-strike-is-released/2014/06/23/1f48dd16-faec- 1 1e3-8176-
f2c941cf35f1_story.html; see also Josh Gerstein, Official Memo Justifying Drone
Strikes Leaks, POLITICO (Feb. 4, 2013, 11:55 PM),
http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/02/official-memo-justifying-
drone-strikes-leaks-156106.html (discussing a white paper written by the
Department of Justice detailing legal justifications for drone strikes).
76 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Address at the
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010).
n Id.
7 Id.
7 Id.
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against the United States." Second, Koh argued that drones can
constitute appropriate instruments for such missions, so long as
their use conforms to the laws of war."' Third, Koh emphasized
that enemy targets are always selected through robust
procedures, and that because of this, they require no other legal
process.82 Finally, Koh argued that targeting high-level
belligerent leaders via drone strikes does not violate domestic law
banning assassinations.
Second, Attorney General Eric Holder confirmed the above-
discussed view of targeted killings, in a 2012 speech, which
followed the confirmation of a targeted killing via a C.I.A.-
operated drone strike of a U.S. citizen, Anwar al-Awlaki, on
September 30, 2011.84 Al-Awlaki had been accused of holding
prominent roles within the ranks of al-Qaeda and had been
placed on a "hit list," authorized by President Obama." His
assassination marked the first time in history that an American
citizen had been targeted abroad without any judicial
involvement or proceedings in determining the guilt of such a
citizen.8 6 Holder argued that targeted killings of American
citizens are legal if the targeted citizen is located abroad, if he/she
is a senior operational leader of al-Qaeda or associated forces, if
he/she is actively engaged in planning to kill Americans, if he/she
poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United
States government and cannot be captured, and if the targeted
strike is conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of
war principles." Following Attorney General Holder's remarks,
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 See Al Qaeda's Anwar al-Awlaki Killed in Yemen, CBS NEWS (Sept. 30,
2011, 3:18 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/al-qaedas-anwar-al-awlaki-
killed-in-yemen/; US Attorney General Justifies 'Targeted Kill' Programme,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2012, 6:03 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/05/attorney-general-targeted-kill-
programme.
85 See Steve Coll, Kill or Capture, NEW YORKER (Aug. 2, 2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/kill-or-capture; Glenn
Greenwald, The Due-Process-Free Assassination of U.S. Citizens Is Now Reality,
SALON (Sept. 30, 2011, 6:31 AM), http://www.salon.com/2011/09/30/awlaki_6/.
86 See Coll, supra note 85.
87 See Joe Palazzolo, Key Excerpts from Holder's Speech on Targeted Killing,
WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Mar. 5, 2012, 5:13 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/03/05/key-excerpts-from-holders-speech-on-
targeted-killing/ (including excerpts of the most relevant portions of Attorney
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the Department of Justice published a White Paper entitled
"Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S.
Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa'ida or An
Associated Force," in which it confirmed this approach by
concluding that:
[I]t would be lawful for the United States to conduct a lethal
operation outside the United States against a U.S. citizen who is a
senior, operational leader of al-Qa'ida or an associated force of al-
Qa'ida without violating the Constitution or the federal statutes
discussed in this white paper under the following conditions: (1) an
informed, high-level official of the U.S. government has determined
that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent
attack against the United States; (2) capture is infeasible, and the
United States continues to monitor whether capture becomes
feasible; and (3) the operation is conducted in a manner consistent
with the four fundamental principles of the laws of war governing
the use of force."
Last but not least, President Obama himself addressed the use
of targeted strikes, in a much-commented-upon speech delivered
at the National Defense University on May 23, 2013.89 President
Obama emphasized that the war against terrorists is different
than traditional warfare, and that the United States continues to
be threatened by terrorists.90  However, President Obama
distanced himself from the Bush-era "war on terror" policy, by
stating that "[b]eyond Afghanistan, we must define our effort not
as a boundless 'global war on terror,' but rather as a series of
persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of
violent extremists that threaten America."9' Instead, President
Obama argued that the United States was engaged in a "war with
al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces."9 2 In the
General Holder's speech on targeted killings).
88 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED
AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA'IDA OR
AN ASSOCIATED FORCE 16 (2011) (released Feb. 5, 2013), available at
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/ilmsnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJWhitePaper.p
df.
89 Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President
at the National Defense University (May 23, 2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-
national-defense-university.
90 See id.
92 Id.
92 Id.
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President's view, American actions, in using drones to conduct
targeted killings, are legal under both domestic and international
law, and the war "is a just war-a war waged proportionally, in
last resort, and in self-defense.""
President Obama next attempted to alleviate concerns about
the drone program's lack of transparency.94 He announced that
his Administration had developed a framework that would govern
the use of force against terrorists, and that this framework,
"insisting upon clear guidelines, oversight and accountability[J"
had been codified in Presidential Policy Guidance, signed by
President Obama on May 22, 2013.95 President Obama also
emphasized that drone strikes are not undertaken as a punitive
measure, but instead as lethal actions against "terrorists who
pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people,
and when there are no other governments capable of effectively
addressing the threat."96 In addition, President Obama
highlighted that the risk to civilian injury by drone strikes would
be minimized because "before any strike is taken, there must be
near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured-the
highest standard we can set."97 Next, President Obama
acknowledged the lack of transparency which had accompanied
covert drone operations and which had shielded the American
government from any real scrutiny.9 8 To remedy this issue,
President Obama announced stronger oversight of all lethal
operations: he announced that his Administration had begun
briefing appropriate Congressional committees on all strikes
conducted outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, the traditional
theaters of war, and he confirmed that such committees had been
briefed on the targeting of a United States citizen, Anwar
Awlaki.99 President Obama confirmed the policy of targeting
United States citizens, already announced by Attorney General
Eric Holder, only in exceptional circumstances.'0
93 Id.
94 Id.
9 Id.
96 Id.
9 President Obama also acknowledged that drone strikes have caused
civilian injury and death, and that they would likely continue to do so in the
future. However, in what looks like a proportionality analysis, he asserted that
"[d]oing nothing is not an option" in instances where terrorist actions would
cause more civilian deaths than civilian deaths caused by drone strikes. Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Terry Frieden, Holder Does Not Rule Out Drone Strike Scenario in U.S.,
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But when a U.S. citizen goes abroad to wage war against America
and is actively plotting to kill U.S. citizens, and when neither the
United States, nor our partners are in a position to capture him
before he carries out a plot, his citizenship should no more serve as
a shield than a sniper shooting down on an innocent crowd should
be protected from a SWAT team.'o
Finally, President Obama announced that his Administration
would review proposals to extend appropriate oversight of lethal
operations conducted outside traditional war theaters, beyond
reporting to Congress.'0 2 President Obama acknowledged that
such oversight would be politically, constitutionally, and
bureaucratically challenging, but he pledged to engage Congress
in exploring these options.3
Following President Obama's speech in which he referenced a
newly developed Presidential Policy Guidance on the use of
drones, this Guidance was published under the title "U.S. Policy
Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in
Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and
Areas of Active Hostilities."'0 4 The Guidance is a brief, three-page
document, which codifies and confirms most of the arguments
advanced by President Obama in his May 23, 2013 speech.'5 The
Guidance states that for any lethal operation, there must be a
legal basis, and that lethal strikes will only be conducted if the
target poses a continuing imminent threat to American citizens.'
The Guidance also states that for every strike, five conditions
must be met:
1. Near certainty that the terrorist target is present;
2. Near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or
killed;
3. An assessment hat capture is not feasible at the time of
CNN (Mar. 6, 2013, 5:53 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/05/politics/Obama-
drones-cia/index.html; see Obama, supra note 89.
01 Obama, supra note 89.
102 Id.
103 See id.
104 See Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force
in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active
Hostilities, WHITE HOUSE (May 23, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-us-policy-standards-and-procedures-use-force-
counterterrorism [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
1os See id.
106 Id.
146 [Vol. 8
COVERT USE OF DRONES
the operation;
4. An assessment that the relevant governmental authorities
in the country where action is contemplated cannot or will
not effectively address the threat to U.S. persons; and
5. An assessment hat no other reasonable alternatives exist
to effectively address the threat to U.S. persons.o7
The Guidance concludes that because drone operations are
always carried out on the territory of foreign nations, the United
States conducts such operations while respecting the sovereignty
of territorial nations where targets may be found and while
abiding by law of armed conflict principles.'" The Guidance also
addresses the oversight issue.'09 It provides that each targeting
operations will be reviewed by key officials at relevant
governmental departments and agencies, who may reach the
ultimate decision to approve the use of deadly force via a drone
strike."0
These decisions will be informed by a broad analysis of an intended
target's current and past role in plots threatening U.S. persons;
relevant intelligence information the individual could provide; and
the potential impact of the operation on ongoing terrorism plotting,
on the capabilities of terrorist organizations, on U.S. foreign
relations, and on U.S. intelligence collection. Such analysis will
inform consideration of whether the individual meets both the
legal and policy standards for the operation.
The Guidance also provides more specific considerations in the
case when the targeted individual is an American citizen; in this
instance, "the Department of Justice will conduct an additional
legal analysis to ensure that such action may be conducted
against the individual consistent with the Constitution and laws
of the United States.""2 Finally, the Guidance confirms the
ongoing existence of congressional oversight, by stating that
members of the Congress will be regularly provided with updates
identifying any individuals against whom lethal force has been
approved, and that the appropriate congressional committees will
be notified whenever a counterterrorism operation covered by the
107 Id.
08 Id.
'09 See id.
110 Id.
" Id.
112 Id.
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Guidance has been conducted.l3
All three above-referenced speeches, by Harold Koh, Eric
Holder, and President Obama himself, as well as the drone
Guidance and the Department of Justice White Paper, shed light
on the Obama Administration's general policy on targeted
strikes." To that extent, the speeches can be interpreted as a
willingness of the Obama Administration to expose itself to a
higher level of scrutiny regarding its drone use. However, none of
the speeches truly addressed the issue of secrecy-the fact that
the C.I.A. has not released any documents regarding its targeting
practices, and that the public has been kept in the dark about any
specifics of the lethal use of force by the C.I.A. in counter-
terrorism operations. Koh, Holder, and President Obama have
all argued that the Obama Administration respects national and
international laws, and that the public should trust them,
without asking too many questions."' Concluding that drone
operations comply with all relevant national and international
laws, however, requires knowledge about the details of such
operations, which the C.I.A. has not shared thus far.
The section below will analyze the legality of drone strikes
under international law; it will also conclude that assessing
difficult legal issues under international law would necessitate
the sharing of information about particular drone operations.
Secrecy seems to have inhibited a proper application of an
international legal framework to the use of drones by the C.I.A.
B. Are Drone Strikes Legal Under International Law?
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits states from
using force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any other states."' This general ban on the use
of force applies to any use of military force, including to the use of
drones.'' The two accepted exceptions to this general ban on the
use of force under international aw include situations where the
Security Council authorizes the use of force against a particular
state, and self-defense."' The United States has been using
"13 Id.
H4 See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
H5 See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
"I6 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
" See Raul A. Pedrozo, Use of Unmanned Systems to Combat Terrorism, 87
INT'L L. STUD. 217, 218 (2011).
18 Laurie R. Blank, Targeted Strikes: The Consequences ofBlurring the
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drones in multiple countries without Security Council
involvement or authorization;"' thus, the only manner in which
the United States can justify its use of force in these instances is
through self-defense. The United States has argued that the
terrorist attack on September 11 was an act of war, that the
United States is entitled to respond, in self-defense, against the
terrorist groups, anywhere that such terrorist groups may be
found.120
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter authorizes any state
which is under an "armed attack" to use force in response, under
the paradigm of self-defense.2 ' International law is presently
unclear as to what constitutes an armed attack, and whether any
type of attack by a non-state actor, such as a terrorist group, can
constitute an armed attack and as such trigger a self-defense
response by the attacked states.'2 2 The International Court of
Justice (ICJ) has held in the well-known Nicaragua case that only
"grave forms of the use of force" trigger a State's right to use self-
defense under the United Nations Charter.'2 3 Some scholars,
including United Nations Special Rapporteur Philip Alston, have
similarly argued that armed attacks which give rise to the right
of self-defense are limited to "'massive armed aggression' that
'imperils . .. life or government,' and that individual acts[, such
as the al Qaeda attack of 9/11 against the United States,] do
not ... constitute an 'armed attack' under the [United Nations]
Charter."'24 The ICJ Nicaragua case mentioned above has been
Armed Conflict and Self-Defense Justifications, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1655,
1662 (2012).
"l9 See id. at 1655.
120 See, e.g., Koh, supra note 76; Obama, supra note 89; Vogel, supra note 65,
at 107; see also Exec. Order No. 13239, 66 Fed. Reg. 64907 (Dec. 12, 2001);
Military Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
121 U.N. Charter art. 51.
122 Because many scholars have already grappled with the parameters of self-
defense in response to terrorist attacks, this Article will only discuss some of the
main viewpoints on this complex issue. See, e.g., YORAm DINSTEIN, WAR
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 182-87 (2d ed. 1994); David Kretzmer, Targeted
Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means
of Defense?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 171, 203 (2005); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense
Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in
Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 237, 238 (2010); Michael N. Schmitt,
Responding to Transnational Terrorism Under the Jus Ad Bellum: A Normative
Framework, 56 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 8 (2008).
123 Andrew C. Orr, Note, Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved: The
Status of American Drone Strikes in Pakistan Under International Law, 44 Co
INT'L L.J. 729, 736-37 (2011).
124 Id. at 737.
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similarly interpreted to require such a high bar.'25 Moreover, a
more recent ICJ case limits the concept of "armed attack" to
actions by state actors, which would also exclude any acts by non-
state actors, such as al-Qaeda, from constituting an armed attack
triggering the United States' right of self-defense. 126
However, recent scholarship has questioned this type of
textualist reading of Article 51 because it is neither "natural nor
realistic."'27 First, Article 51 does not state that the right of self-
defense is only available when an armed attack is launched by a
state actor.'28 Three different ICJ judges, Koojimans, Higgins,
and Simma, have pointed this out and have questioned whether
armed attacks are limited to state actors.'29 "In an era where
non-state groups project military-scale power, the better view is
that non-state actors, such as al-Qaeda, can carry out armed
attacks."' In addition, in an lCJ case subsequent to the
Nicaragua case, the so-called Oil Platforms case, the Court made
it clear that an individual act of violence could be sufficient to
constitute an armed attack.'' Customary international law can
also be interpreted as embracing a definition of "armed attack" as
carried out by a non-state actor. The famous Caroline paradigm
permits states to use self-defense against non-state actors, and
the case itself involved non-state actors and hostilities.'32 Finally,
many have argued that the international community's
acquiescence to the United States' use of military force in
Afghanistan following 9/11 supports the proposition that attacks
by non-state actors can trigger a state's right to self-defense
under Article 51. 13
125 Id.
126 Id. at 738
27 Id. at 739.
28 See id.
I29 Id.
30 Id.
3I See Case Concerning the Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov.
6).
132 The Caroline Incident occurred when British troops crossed the Niagara
River to the American side and attacked the steamer Caroline; the British
justified the attack as an act of self-defense. United States Secretary of State
Webster wrote a letter to his British counterpart, in which he famously stated
that any use of force in self-defense should be limited to situations in which the
"necessity of self-defence, [is] instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation." R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod
Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 89 (1938).
'33 See Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the "Grotian Moment"- Accelerated
Formation of Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change,
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The Obama Administration has embraced the latter view: that
a state's right to self-defense applies against non-state actors, if
and when such non-state actors operate out of the territory of
states which are not doing much to stop such terrorist activity.
The Obama Administration officials have claimed publicly that
international law does not prohibit the use of deadly force against
an active enemy "when the country involved consents or is unable
or unwilling to take action against the threat."'3 4 In a speech
delivered at Harvard Law School, John Brennan, Assistant to the
President on Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, stated:
The United States does not view our authority to use military force
against al-Qa'ida as being restricted solely to "hot" battlefields like
Afghanistan. Because we are engaged in an armed conflict with al-
Qa'ida, the United States takes the legal position that-in
accordance with international law-we have the authority to take
action against al-Qa'ida and its associated forces without doing a
separate self-defense analysis each time. And as President Obama
has stated on numerous occasions, we reserve the right to take
unilateral action if or when other governments are unwilling or
unable to take the necessary actions themselves.'
While the United Nations has largely stayed out of this "war,"
the United States' position finds limited support in some United
Nations' documents. The United Nations Security Council has
stated that "[e]very State has the duty to refrain from ...
acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed
towards the commission of such acts, when [such] acts. . . involve
a threat or use of force." 6 And the United Nations Special
Rapporteur Philip Alston has argued that:
[a] targeted killing conducted by one State in the territory of a
second State does not violate the second State's sovereignty
[where] . . . the first, targeting, State has a right under
43 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 439, 451-52 (2010) (arguing that post-9/11, the law of self-
defense rapidly evolved to embrace the concept of self-defensive war against
non-state actors); Milena Sterio, A Grotian Moment: Changes in the Legal
Theory of Statehood, 39 DENVER J. INT'L L & POL'Y 209, 213-15 (2011).
'14 Peter Bergen, John Brennan, Obama's Drone Warrior, CNN (Jan. 9, 2013,
8:39 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/13/opinion/bergen-brennan-drones/.
"s John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Program on Law and Security at Harvard
Law School (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-
our-values-an (emphasis added).
36 G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970).
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international law to use force in self-defence under Article 51 of the
UN Charter ... [and] the second State is unwilling or unable to
stop armed attacks against the first State launched from its
territory. 137
If one accepts the argument that the United States can lawfully
exercise its right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter against terrorist suspects, then the United
States could act on the territory of any nation that is harboring
such terrorist suspects, by being unwilling or unable to stop their
harmful activity against the United States. In order to assess
this question, however, one would have to focus on each country
where drone strikes are currently conducted. For example, one
could conclude that drone strikes are legal in Yemen but illegal in
Pakistan, under this rationale. And, in order to full assess
whether any nation is unwilling or unable to combat terrorism
within its borders, one would need access to intelligence
information and other relevant data about each state where
targeting operations are proposed. The C.I.A. has not shared any
such data thus far and it is very difficult to determine whether
drone operations are justified under the "unwilling or unable"
standard in each nation in which they have been used (Yemen,
Somalia, Pakistan). Thus, it is difficult to assess the validity of
the United States' self-defense argument, because of its lack of
geographic constraints-while the self-defense argument could be
valid in some places where the C.I.A. conducts drone strikes, it
could be perfectly invalid in others.
Even if one accepts the argument that the United States can
lawfully exercise its right of self-defense against terrorist
suspects pursuant to Article 51, any exercise of self-defense must
comply with the jus ad bellum requirements of necessity and
proportionality. Under jus ad bellum, the initial use of force must
be necessary and proportionate to the campaign's objective.'3 1
The requirement of proportionality in jus ad bellum measures the
extent of the use of force against the overall military goals, such as
fending off an attack or subordinating the enemy. The
requirement of necessity addresses whether there are adequate
137 Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
Study on Targeted Killings, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24
(May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston).
38 See Blank, supra note 118, at 1658 (explaining the term jus ad bellum).
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non-forceful options to deter or defeat the attack.'3 9
The necessity requirement within the paradigm of targeted
strikes, used against a terrorist group who poses a threat to
American national security, can be further subdivided into two
prongs: imminence and alternatives.4 0 First, an imminent threat
is "a clear and present danger" which unless addressed can cause
harm to civilians. 4 ' Moreover, the targeting state must ask itself
whether targeting a terrorist suspect is necessary because the
host state is unable or unwilling to act against the threat which
the terrorist poses, and also "whether targeting [such a suspect]
would advance the goal of preventing further attacks."4 2 Second,
the targeting state must demonstrate the lack of alternative to
the use of lethal force as a way of deterring the threat posed by
the terrorist suspect.'4 3  Thus, "the targeting of suspected
terrorists must be restricted to cases in which there is credible
evidence that the targeted persons are actively involved in
planning or preparing further terrorist attacks against the victim
state and no other operational means of stopping those attacks
are available."'"
In order to assess whether any of these requirements of jus ad
bellum have been respected during C.I.A.-led covert drone
operations, one would need information about the specificity of
each proposed operation. Why did the targeted individual pose
an imminent threat? How does the agency define "imminence"?
What kind of evidence existed to indicate that the target was in
the process of planning additional attacks on the United States?
How would the targeting of the suspect advance the goal of
prevent subsequent attacks? What other means, short of
conducting a lethal strike, were available to neutralize the
target? Secrecy has prevented all of us from gauging answers at
these difficult questions.
An additional inquiry relevant for determining the legality of
targeted strikes under international law is which legal regime
applies to the use of force by the targeting state against the
targeted individual him or herself. If the targeted strike occurs
within an armed conflict, then the law of armed conflict
'39 Id. at 1665.
140 Id
141 Id. at 1666.
142 Id
143 Id. at 1667.
4 Id.
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determines the legality of each targeted strike; as this paper
discussed above, both the Bush and the Obama Administrations
have consistently claimed that the United States is engaged in an
armed conflict against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.'4 5 However, to
the extent that the United States uses targeted strikes outside of
armed conflict, then international human rights law and the
principles governing the use of force in law enforcement apply.
Because international human rights law provides that every
human being has the right to life, and that the use of lethal force
by state authorities against an individual can be justified only
under limited circumstances, when such use of force is absolutely
necessary,"4 it follows that "[tihe use of lethal force against
suspected terrorists outside of armed conflict can therefore only
be used when absolutely necessary to protect potential victims of
terrorist acts."'47 The definition of "absolute necessity" for the
purposes of determining when lethal force may be used against
individual terrorist suspects by targeting states remains
somewhat uncertain.'4 8 In fact, some scholars have recently
argued that there exists an additional paradigm of "self-defense
targeting," which stands for the proposition that the traditional
"jus ad bellum right of self-defense creates sufficient ... authority
for the use of military force to target a threat without relying on
either the law of armed conflict . .. or human rights law for
regulating authority."4 9
It is beyond the scope of this Article to assess the validity of the
above-mentioned "self-defense targeting" argument. It suffices to
state that in the context of American drone operations conducted
against terrorism suspects, the United States has consistently
argued that the law of armed conflict, as lex specialis, applies to
the ongoing war against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated
forces, and that the law of armed conflict displaces other
potentially applicable legal frameworks, such as international
human rights law.'" Here, secrecy appears less problematic, as it
plays almost no role in determining which legal regime applies to
145 See supra Part III.A.3.
146 Blank, supra note 118, at 1667-68.
147 Id. at 1668.
148 Id.
149 Id.
'so See supra Part III.A.3 (providing a detailed description of statements
made by Obama Administration officials, and the president himself, declaring
that the United States is engaged in an armed conflict against specific terrorist
groups and their associates).
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the use of lethal force via drone strikes. It can be argued,
nonetheless, that secrecy has inhibited the public from
questioning the validity of the United States' argument that it is
engaged in an ongoing armed conflict against specific groups. It
may be that this conflict has ended, but we simply do not know
about it. Or it may be that it is ongoing in Pakistan and Yemen,
but not in Somalia.
These questions are relevant, because they determine the
applicability of particular legal regimes to targeting operations,
which are more easily justifiable under the law of armed conflict
than under the law enforcement paradigm or international
human rights law. One could conclude, for example, that drone
operations are only legal under the law of armed conflict and thus
only legal in places where the armed conflict has not ended;
conversely, one could then conclude that drone operations are
illegal per se in places where armed conflict has ended. We can
ask these questions, but until the C.I.A. releases more
information about its drone operations, we will likely not obtain
any solid answers.
C. Jus In Bello: Is There an Armed Conflict Between the
United States and Terrorist Suspects?
The Bush and Obama Administrations have consistently
characterized the conflict with al-Qaeda, Taliban, and other
associated force as an armed conflict."' This characterization is
relevant, because if accepted, it dictates the applicability of the
law of armed conflict as lex specialis.'52 In the view of the Bush
and Obama Administrations, the terrorist attacks of 9/11
constituted an act of war by a non-state terrorist actor, thereby
triggering the application of the law of armed conflict.'
Law of armed conflict, otherwise known as jus in bello or
international humanitarian law, governs the conduct of states as
well as non-state actors during armed conflict.'54 Its primary
"I See supra Part III.A.3.
52 Lex Specialis Law & Legal Definition, USLEGAL,
http://definitions.uslegal.com/l/lex-specialis/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (defining
the term "lex specialis" as a Latin phrase meaning "law governing a specific
subject matter." The doctrine relates to the interpretation of laws in both
domestic and international law).
'" See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
154 U.N. Office of the High Comm'r on Human Rights, International Legal
Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/01 (2011).
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purpose is to minimize suffering during war time by protecting
categories of individuals not participating in hostilities and by
limiting the methods of warfare.' Three main principles of law
of armed conflict, relevant for the purposes of determining the
legality of targeted strikes, include the principles of distinction,
proportionality, and precautions.'
The principle of distinction requires that any party to an armed
conflict distinguish between those who participate in the conflict
and those who do not; only the former can be lawfully targeted.'
The obligation to distinguish between participants to an armed
conflict and non-participants is one of the core principles of the
law of armed conflict; it applies to both international and non-
international armed conflict, and it is enshrined in both treaty
law, as well as in customary international law.' In order for a
targeting state to respect the principle of distinction, it must first
identify a lawful target.' "A lawful attack must be directed at a
legitimate target: either a combatant, member of an organized
armed group, a civilian directly participating in hostilities, or a
military objective."'o "In non-international armed conflicts, . . .
individuals who are members of an organized [non-state] armed
group are legitimate targets of attacks at all times."'"' In
addition, civilians who directly participate in hostilities can also
be legitimately targeted during the time that they engage in such
"I Blank, supra note 118, at 1669.
156 Id.
'1 See id. at 1671.
I See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 111 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (emphasizing the need "for measures to ensure the
better protection of human rights in armed conflict of all types. . . .") (emphasis
added); see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 257 (July 8) (noting that distinction is one of the
"intransgressible principles of international customary law."). The principle of
distinction is set forth in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions; "the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between
the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and
military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against
military objectives." Its purpose is set out in Article 51 of Additional Protocol I;
"[t]he civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the
object of attack." Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I), June 8, 1977, art. 48, 51 [hereinafter Protocol I].
I See Blank, supra note 118, at 1671.
160 Id.
161 Id.
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hostilities.'62 While scholars, courts and commentators have
struggled to define the exact parameters of "direct participation"
for determining when and under which circumstances civilians
may be targeted during armed conflict, almost all agree that
civilians lose their protected status under the law of armed
conflict if they choose to engage in the conflict itself.'6 3
The United States government has argued that it is engaged in
a non-international armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban,
and associated forces, and that almost any member of al-Qaeda,
the Taliban, or associated forces is targetable.'" A scholar has
described the United States' approach to defining lawful targets
in the following manner: "that any military aged male in a kill
zone is properly determined to be targetable."'65 Former C.I.A.
Director, Michael Hayden, was probably correct when he stated
that no other governments in the world, except for Afghanistan
and maybe Israel, would agree with this rationale.'6
The second principle of the law of armed conflict is "the
principle of proportionality, [which] requires that parties refrain
from attacks in which the expected civilian casualties will be
excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage
gained."' This principle is derived from two ideas: first, that the
means of attacking the enemy should never be limited, and
second, that the legal requirement of non-targeting civilians,
described above, does not entail a total prohibition on civilian
62 Protocol I, supra note 158, at art. 51.
61 See, e.g., HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr. ¶
6 [2005] (Isr.); Jason Callen, Unlawful Combatants and the Geneva Conventions,
44 VA. J. INT'L L. 1025, 1033-34 (2004); Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law
and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian
Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 511, 519 (2005); Kenneth W. Watkin, Combatants,
Unprivileged Belligerents and Conflict in the 21st Century, 1 ISR. DEF. FORCEs L.
REV. 69, 72 (2003).
164 Kenneth Anderson, Self-Defense and Non-International Armed Conflict in
Drone Warfare, OPINIo JURIS (Oct. 22, 2010, 6:17 AM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/10/22/self-defense-and-non-international-armed-
conflict-in-drone-warfare/.
'6 Gabor Rona, The Last Word (For Now) on Targeted Killings: Rona
Responds to Lewis, OPINIo JURIS (Aug. 3, 2012, 11:00 AM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2012/08/03/the-last-word-for-now-on-targeted-killings-rona-
responds-to-lewis/.
166 Former CIA Director Hayden Slams Obama Drone Program, DEMOCRACY
Now (Feb. 07, 2012),
http://www.democracynow.org/2012/2/7/headlines/former-ciadirector-hayden-sl
ams obama drone-program.
167 Blank, supra note 118, at 1673.
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casualties.'8 Instead, each military commander is directed to
assess the military advantage to be gained from a lawful military
operation in relation to the likely number of civilian casualties.'6 9
The principle of proportionality, thus, encompasses two other
ideas-military necessity and humanity-by balancing them
against each other.' The proportionality analysis is to be
conducted prospectively by a military commander; it serves as a
guideline to ensure that commanders refrain from types of
attacks which will cause excessive civilian suffering and deaths."'
Like the principle of distinction, the principle of proportionality is
espoused by both treaty and customary international law. 2
The third principle of the law of armed conflict is the principle
of precautions."' Scholars have argued that in addition to the
obligation of state parties to an armed conflict to properly identify
military objectives and to respect the principle of proportionality,
such state parties have an increased duty to take precautionary
measures to protect civilians. ' "Precautions are,
understandably, a critical component of the law's efforts to
protect civilians and are of particular importance in densely
populated areas or areas where civilians are at risk from the
consequences of military operations.""' Various methods of
taking precautions involve ensuring that targets are military
168 Id.
169 See id.
'7 See id.
71 See id.
72 The principle of proportionality can be found in three separate provisions
of Additional Protocol I. Article 51 prohibits "an[y] attack which may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." Protocol I, supra note
158, at art. 51(5)(b); Blank, supra note 118, at 1673. The same language
appears again in Articles 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b), which also refer to
precautions. Protocol I, supra note 158, at art. 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b). In
addition, courts and scholars have concluded that the principle of
proportionality is a well-accepted norm of customary international law. See
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 245 (July 8); see also Michael N. Schmitt, Fault Lines in the Law of Attack,
in TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw 277, 292
(Susan Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-Neale eds., 2006); Yoram Dinstein, The Laws
of Air, Missile and Nuclear Warfare, 27 ISR. Y.B. on H. R. 1, 7 (1997).
1 Article 57(1) of Additional Protocol I states that "[i]n the conduct of
military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian
population, civilians and civilian objects." Protocol I, supra note 158, at art.
57(1).
174 See, e.g., Blank, supra note 118, at 1674.
'7 Id.
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objectives in every instance, choosing means and methods of
attack with the aim of minimizing incidental civilian losses and
damage, launching attacks at night when the civilian population
is less likely to be in public places, refraining from any
disproportionate attack, and warning civilians of attacks in
advance, whenever circumstances so permit.176
It is extremely difficult to assess whether C.I.A.-led drone
strikes satisfy these fundamental principles of jus in bello. All
jus in bello inquiries are highly fact-specific. It may be that most,
if not all, drone strikes satisfy the requirements of distinction,
proportionality, and precautions, but unless and until the C.I.A.
releases more factual information regarding specific operations,
all we will be able to do is continue to ask these questions.
D. Where is the Battlefield?
Another issue that has been raised in the context of drone
operations and that has already been tangentially explored above,
is where precisely the United States may lawfully conduct lethal
strikes. In other words, where exactly is the battlefield in this
global war against terrorists?
Mary Ellen O'Connell has argued that:
[T]he United States is engaged in armed conflict only in
Afghanistan. To lawfully resort to military force elsewhere
requires that the country where the United States is attacking has
first attacked the United States (such as Afghanistan in 2001), the
U.N. Security Council has authorized the resort to force (Libya in
2011) or a government in effective control credibly requests
assistance in a civil war (Afghanistan since 2002).'n
According to this view, the battlefield where the United States
could legally engage in military operations can lie in Afghanistan
only pursuant to the self-defense rationale, and in Libya,
pursuant to Security Council authorization. The battlefield may
not lie in places such as Pakistan, Somalia, or Yemen, because
the United States is not engaged in armed conflict in those places.
The United States' government position, on the contrary, has
consistently been that the battlefield follows al-Qaeda, Taliban,
176 See id. at 1674-75.
"' Mary Ellen O'Connell, When Are Drone Killings Illegal?, CNN (Aug. 16,
2012, 11:12 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/15/opinion/oconnell-targeted-
killing.
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and associated forces members, and that, accordingly, the United
States can launch a strike anywhere that such persons may be
found. '
Under the Bush Administration, the position of the United
States was that the country was engaged in an armed conflict
against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and that the applicable law, as
lex specialis, was the law of armed conflict, no matter where our
enemies may be found."' The Obama Administration has
followed this approach, and has expanded the definition of our
armed conflict opponent, which now includes al-Qaeda, the
Taliban, and any associated forces.' According to the view of the
Obama Administration, drone strikes may be carried out both
within a recognized theater of active armed conflict, such as
Afghanistan and Iraq, but also in countries which either consent
to drone strikes, appear unwilling, or unable to combat non-state
terrorist actors, such as Pakistan (consent), Somalia, and
Yemen."' "U.S. officials have argued that the fight with AUMF
enemies is global, not confined to the territory of one country."'8 2
According to the legal rationale advanced by then Legal Advisor
to the State Department, Harold Koh, deciding "whether a
particular individual will be targeted in a particular location will
depend upon considerations specific to each case, including those
related to . .. the sovereignty of the other states involved, and the
willingness and ability of those states to suppress the threat the
target poses."' This rationale would arguably exclude the
possibility of conducting drone strikes in countries which are able
and willing to combat terrorist threats, but would allow the
United States to use lethal force in self-defense, in the territory of
countries which are not engaged in any armed conflict against the
United States but which harbor al-Qaeda and Taliban
associates.8 4 It is uncertain whether the United States would,
1 See Vogel, supra note 65, at 108, 130.
17 See, e.g., id. at 107 (noting that "in both the Bush and Obama
Administrations, the Executive Branch has consistently characterized the
current conflicts to be armed conflicts, governed primarily by the lex specialis of
the laws of war."); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006)
(characterizing the conflict with al-Qaeda as armed conflict to which the laws of
war apply); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
8s0 See Koh, supra note 76.
m8 See Vogel, supra note 65, at 132.
82 Id. at 130.
"8 Koh, supra note 76.
184 See Vogel, supra note 65, at 132.
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under this rationale, choose to conduct drone strikes in "neutral
states," such as Kenya, the Philippines, and Saudi Arabia, which
do appear willing and capable to combat terrorist groups within
their borders, in a scenario where high-level terrorist suspects
were located in these countries.'" What is unquestionable is that
the United States believes that because it is engaged in an armed
conflict of a global nature, the law of armed conflict applies in
each instance, regardless of the location of each drone strike.'86 It
can be argued, therefore, that under the current view of the
Obama Administration, location of drone strike matters but it is
not prohibitive. Location matters because drone strikes cannot be
carried out in countries which have not consented or which are
able and willing to combat terrorist threats; location is not
prohibitive because drone strikes can be carried out in any
country which has consented or which is not able or willing to
combat terrorist threat.'
Scholars have defended this view,' because modern-day
conflicts oppose state versus non-state actors, who often do not
have a strict territorial nexus to any particular state, thus
interjecting a layer of complexity into the definition of a battle
field.'89 "Once we are outside the belligerent-neutral framework
that defined the traditional battlespace, determining the
parameters of the contemporary battlefield or zone of combat
becomes significantly more complicated."'" Others, however,
would disagree with this view and would argue that expanding
the definition of a battlefield without any legal limitations
represents a dangerous precedent, as it places no limits on where
the war may be waged.9 ' The secrecy of C.I.A.-run drone
operations has disabled the public from knowing where the
armed conflict may be occurring; coupled with the legal rationale
mentioned directly above-that the war is of a global nature and
that the battle field follows our terrorist enemies-secrecy in this
context has allowed the C.I.A. to target anyone anywhere, with
very little accountability.'92 Releasing information about
geography of C.I.A. -conducted strikes would at least allow the
8 See id.
6 See id. at 130.
8 See id. at 132-33,
188 See, e.g., id.
89 See Blank, supra note 6, at 711.
190 Id.
19' See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 177; Rona, supra note 165.
192 See Vogel, supra note 65, at 135-36.
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public to begin to ask relevant questions about the legal
parameters of the battle field, in this new type of warfare."'
E. What Types of Strikes are Conducted? Personality
Versus Signature?
Last but not least, it has been reported that the C.I.A. conducts
two different types of drone strikes.'9 4 The covert nature of these
operations has precluded the public from the ability to inquire
about the different types of drone operations, toward the goal of
ensuring that such operations are run with appropriate regard for
domestic and international law.'95
Drone strikes fall into two essential categories: personality
strikes and signature strikes.'9 6 Personality strikes are those
conducted against a specific individual, who has been identified
as posing a significant threat to the United States and whose
targeting has been specifically approved by the President.'
Personality strikes appear less controversial because they can
somewhat easily comply with the relevant legal requirements,
assuming that the target has been properly identified as a
combatant, and assuming that the strike itself is conducted in a
manner consistent with jus in bello principles.'9 8 If one were to
reject the argument that the United States is engaged in an
armed conflict against non-state actors belonging to al-Qaeda and
Taliban groups, then even personality strikes become of dubious
legality, because the relevant legal framework shifts to a law
enforcement paradigm and international human rights law,
which allows for the targeting of individuals only when absolutely
necessary.' It does not appear that most personality strikes are
conducted in instances where such targeting is one of strict
necessity; instead, it appears that personality strikes are carried
out when targets of high value are identified and when their
neutralization seems beneficial toward the United States
19 See id.
194 See Scott Shane, Election Spurred a Move to Codify U.S. Drone Policy,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2012, at Al.
'9 See id.
96 See id.
197 See Brian Glyn Williams, Inside the Murky World of 'Signature Strikes'
and the Killing of Americans With Drones, HUFFINGTON PosT (May 31, 2013,
4:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-glyn-williams/nside-the-murky-
world-of- b 3367780.html.
98 See supra Part.III.C.
9 See supra Part.I.B.
162 [Vol. 8
COVERT USE OF DRONES
military's advantage.200 A signature strike, on the contrary,
is a drone strike on suspected terrorists or militants whose
identities are not known, but whose "pattern of life activity" would
seem to indicate that they are involved in some militant/terrorist
activity. These activities could range, for example, from
associating with known terrorists in an Al Qaeda hujra (guest
house) to sneaking across the border into Afghanistan from
Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal zones with a group of Taliban
insurgents.2 01
Signature strikes are inherently harder to justify under any
applicable legal framework, including the law of armed conflict,
because it is uncertain whether they can adequately comply with
the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions.202
Some have criticized the development of signature strikes, by
arguing "that a program that began as a carefully focused effort
to kill senior al-Qaeda leaders had morphed into a bombing
campaign against low-level Taliban fighters[,]" and that the
Obama Administration had adopted "a de facto 'kill not capture'
policy . . . ."203
Whether one accepts the argument that the law of armed
conflict applies to the war against terrorists, or whether one
believes that the law enforcement paradigm and international
human rights law provide the adequate legal framework, it is
impossible to assess the legality of personality and signature
strikes without knowing more about their respective specifics.2 04
It appears that personality strikes may better comply with both
jus in bello and international human rights law and that
signature strikes may comply with jus in bello but violate
international human rights law.205 However, these conclusions, in
the absence of more information provided by the C.I.A., remain
purely speculative. The only way that any scholar or expert could
200 See Background and Context, LIVING UNDER DRONES,
http://www.livingunderdrones.org/background-and-context/ (last visited Oct. 25,
2014).
201 Williams, supra note 197; see also Rohde, supra note 7 (arguing that when
using signature strikes, "CIA drone operators could carry out strikes based on
the behavior of people on the ground. Operators could launch a drone strike if
they saw a group, for example, crossing back and forth over the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border.").
202 See supra Part.III.C.
203 Rohde, supra note 7.
204 See supra Part.JJI.C.
205 See supra Parts II.B, II.C.
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provide legal conclusions about the lawfulness of targeted strikes
is if he or she were provided with more detailed information
about the circumstances of each strike.
IV. CONCLUSION: SECRECY PREVENTS OVERSIGHT AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
The purpose and overall conclusion of this Article is that the
covert nature of C.I.A.-run drone operations has precluded
experts, scholars, judges and the public at large from assessing
the lawfulness of the overall drone program, and of particular
operations. This Article recognizes that the C.I.A.'s primary goal
and mission is to run covert operations, and that the release of
information would, in many instances, jeopardize the success of
prospective operations and put the lives of operators at risk.206
However, this Article argues that the C.I.A. could provide more
policy and legal guidelines about its targeting operations as a
general matter, without prejudicing the likelihood of success of
any specific operation.2 07 For example, the C.I.A. could release
documents about its overall guidelines and policy regarding
signature versus personality strikes. What types of
circumstances and intelligence information typically trigger the
decision to use one versus the other? What kind of information is
analyzed regarding each prospective target, in order to properly
distinguish the target and ensure that its neutralization will not
cause excessive harm to those who are lawfully non-targetable?
And what kind of oversight and accountability does the C.I.A.
truly face?
While President Obama has argued in his speech, and in the
above-discussed Guidance, that congressional oversight is an
integral part of the targeting process,20 very little is known about
actual targeting practices, and the C.I.A. has not been
forthcoming in releasing any particular information about such
practices.20 9 In addition to congressional oversight, many have
argued that courts should be involved in reviewing and approving
targeting decisions, especially when targets are American
citizens.210 Actual judicial review would require the Agency to
206 See supra Part III.A.1.
207 See supra Part III.A.1.
208 See Obama, supra note 89; Fact-Sheet, supra note 104.
209 See Rohde, supra note 7.
210 Id. (noting that Jameel Jaffer, deputy legal director of the ACLU, has
argued that keeping C.I.A. drone operations covert has prevented American
164 [Vol. 8
COVERT USE OF DRONES
release information about the particularities of its drone
operations.2 1 ' "'The administration has claimed the power to
carry out extrajudicial executions of Americans on the basis of
evidence that is secret and is never seen by anyone . . . .' 'It's
hard to understand how that is consistent with the
Constitution."'2 12
It appears that the C.I.A. will be forced to release at least some
information, in light of ACLU-led litigation, mentioned above. It
is this Article's conclusion that the release of any information by
the C.I.A. should be the appropriate starting point of a public
discussion about the legitimacy of the American drone program.
courts from reviewing the constitutionality of such operations).
211 See id.
212 Id. (quoting Jameel Jaffer, deputy legal director of the ACLU).
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